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Abstract: The issues of human rights and freedom are topical in most socio-
political discourse especially in the African continent given the plethora of 
cases of human rights abuse and unnecessary curtailment and most times 
outright denial of freedom to citizens. This constitutes a serious bane to the 
flowering of human potentialities and the general human well-being. This 
anomaly has however continued unabated despite the volumes that have been 
written on the subjects and seminars and conferences held on the same. This 
paper, through the analytic and critical methods, argues that much may not be 
achieved until the philosophical foundation upon which these subjects rest is 
well articulated and appreciated. The paper equally claims that one of the 
ways of enhancing the respect for human rights and freedom in Africa is to 
recognize the symbiotic relationship between the two subjects. The paper 
finally argues that an integral view of human freedom/rights which recognizes 
not only freedom-from but also freedom-to and rights-to, is foundational for 
the promotion of human well-being. 
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Introduction 
The quest for freedom and human rights 
has been from antiquity and has 
continued to the contemporary times, 
taking different approaches and 
assuming various complexities and 
dynamisms. This quest is itself a 
product of man‟s unflinching penchant 
for idealities and promotion of human 
dignity and development even in the 
face of the most gruesome conditions of 
suppression and oppression. Thus, the 
history of freedom and human rights is 
the history of human struggles against 
oppression and other impediments to the 
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In view of this, volumes on the history 
of this struggle and the best possible 
means of achieving, sustaining and 
promoting freedom and human rights 
have been written by scholars, social 
and legal icons, activists and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). 
These volumes expectedly have 
expressed various nuances and 
dynamism to the idea of the twin 
concepts of freedom and human rights. 
 
The relevance of these concepts to any 
legal system or justice system for the 
establishment of a social order requisite 
for human flourishing and development 
cannot be overemphasized thus the 
reason for the much attention they have 
received and will continue to receive. 
Herein lays the relevance of a 
philosophical contribution to and 
exposition on the concepts – freedom 
and human rights. 
 
As philosophical as possible, there is 
need to raise some fundamental 
questions about the ideas of freedom 
and human rights. Such questions are: 
what is the meaning and nature of 
freedom? Is freedom possible? What are 
the possible obstacles to the realization 
of human freedom? What is the meaning 
and nature of human rights? Are humans 
entitled to rights? Can human rights be 
inalienable and absolute? What are the 
possible and actual obstacles to the 
realization and protection of human 
right ideals? What is the relationship 
between freedom and human rights? 
 
The focus of this paper is therefore to 
provide answers and further reflections 
on the above questions. This paper is 
thus divided into seven sections namely: 
introduction, meaning and nature of 
freedom, obstacles to the realization of 
human freedom, meaning and nature of 
human rights, obstacle to the realization 
and protection of human rights, 
relationship between freedom and 
human rights and conclusion. 
 
Meaning and Nature of Freedom 
Man has a natural inclination for 
freedom. He can do anything and 
everything to be free from the 
encumbrances of nature, laws, and the 
environment and even from fellow 
human beings. This he does both at the 
theoretical level and the practical level. 
To this end therefore, freedom has the 
theoretical as well as the practical angles 
to it. Simply put freedom or to be free is 
usually regarded as the capacity to act 
free. This perhaps explains why Hannah 
Arendt (1997) opines that men regard 
themselves as free as long as they act 
neither before nor after: for to be free 
and to act are the same. The practical 
basis of freedom is shown in the 
political and legal spheres. The making 
of laws, the passing of judgments in the 
law courts and the making and taking of 
decisions in the government circles are 
all manifestation of the notion of 
practical freedom. While the issues of 
desires, choice whether it is self-
imposed or predetermined by some 
other factors and the will power to carry 
out the choice are subjects for 
theoretical discussion on freedom. 
 
Rudolf Steiner (1964) provides a good 
theoretical analysis on freedom. He 
makes a distinction between “freedom 
of thought” and “freedom of action”. 
Steiner argues that inner freedom is 
achieved by bridging the gap between 
our perception which reflects the outer 
appearance of the world and our 
cognition which gives us access to the 
inner structure of the world. According 
to him outer freedom arises when we 
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bridge the gap between our ideals and 
the constraints of external reality by 
letting our deeds be inspired by moral 
imagination. He uses the term moral 
imagination to mean an act of creative 
synthesis which an individual 
particularly employed to respond to the 
immediate demands of a given life 
situation. For Steiner, free deeds can 
only be achieved by the application of 
moral imagination. 
 
Further, Steiner (1964) discusses the 
necessary conditions for freedom of 
thought and the condition necessary for 
freedom of actions. He calls the first 
condition “epistemology of freedom” 
and the second he calls “metaphysics of 
freedom” (p.90). In epistemology of 
freedom, Steiner stresses the importance 
of consciousness in particular of rational 
thought for the attainment of freedom 
and further explores the various 
compulsions of motives acting within 
us. He further differentiates motives into 
seven levels: reflexes, drive, desires, 
motives, wishes, intention and 
commitments. On metaphysical 
freedom, Steiner notes that whereas our 
feelings tell how the world affects us, 
our will tells how we affect the world. 
However, neither attain to true 
objectivity. Giving the fact that we can 
either act out of compulsion of our 
natural being (reflexes, drives, desires 
etc) or out of the compulsions of ethical 
principles, and that neither of these 
leaves us free, there is need for a moral 
imagination, a kind of a situational ethic 
arising neither from abstract principles 
nor from our bodily impulses. It is only 
within this context can an action be truly 
free. 
 
Rousseau‟s analysis of human nature 
also gives us insight into the meaning of 
human freedom. Rousseau saw animals 
as slaves to instinct. Though they could 
think in that they could form ideas from 
observations, all of their motivation was 
due to inherited programs that worked 
effectively in the same way as the laws 
of physics, deterministically. Humans 
have instincts too, but often override 
them. In that ability to override instincts 
lays Rousseau‟s definition of freedom. 
For instance, a boy may skip launch 
during an intense session of video 
games. Though the instinct to eat is 
present and food is readily available, he 
however overrides it in order to do 
something which instinct provides him 
no reason to do. According to Rousseau 
an animal would not do so. Therefore 
animals are not free because of lack of 
this capacity to alter or override 
instincts. 
 
Moreso, the ability to advance as a 
species and as an individual supports the 
idea of human freedom. Inanimate 
matter cannot advance; it has no such 
goal as survival so it cannot become 
better at surviving. Animals can to a 
very limited degree; most grow to a 
better adapted adult stage and are able to 
learn to a limited degree through 
conditioning. But only humans are able 
to make huge leap and bounds far 
surpassing their “natural” abilities – 
invention in technologies and 
agriculture etc. Therefore for Rousseau 
freedom means the ability to act 
differently and against instinct. 
 
Be that as it may, the idea of human 
freedom pushes beyond Rousseau‟s 
narrow concept of freedom. An 
adequate rendition of human freedom 
captures the ideas of “freedom from” 
and “freedom to”. Freedom from 
otherwise called negative freedom or 
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freedom of the ancient, is the removal of 
the restrictions that obstruct the full 
development of the person (Iroegbu, 
2000). It equally means emancipation 
from the shackles of something 
considered to be evil, undesirable and 
inhumane to something seen to be good, 
desirable and commendable. For 
instance, “freedom from” a state of 
dehumanization to a state of dignity or 
“freedom from” colonialization to 
independence. On the other hand, 
“freedom to” otherwise known as 
freedom of the moderns is also called 
positive freedom. It means the granting 
to someone the chance and opportunity 
he or she needs for the full realization of 
his or her potentialities and personality. 
This can also be called freedom – 
enablement which gives the capacity to 
do anything without hindrances or 
restriction. To this end, C.B. Okolo 
(1993) writes, 
 
“Freedom from” in social and 
practical meaning becomes  
inseparable from “freedom to” 
actualize oneself through  
effective choices for man is not an 
object but a subject of  
history, the controller and shaper of 
his world” (p. 9) 
 
What this means is that there is a strong 
link between “freedom from” and 
freedom to” such that to deny “freedom 
from” is to seriously jeopardize 
“freedom to”. “Freedom from” is 
meaningless if not backed up with 
“freedom to”. 
 
Obstacles to the Realization of 
Human Freedom 
Anything that hinders the full exercise 
of one‟s talented capacities and other 
natural endowments constitutes itself as 
an obstacle to the realization of human 
freedom. These restrictions or obstacles 
are either external or internal. They can 
equally be preventive or compulsive. 
For instance to be compelled to act is to 
be prevented from omitting an action; 
and to be compelled to omit (forbear, 
abstain) is to be prevented from doing 
(acting). According to George Henrik 
(1984), external restriction on freedom 
can either be physical or normative. 
Where physical restriction can prevent 
one from doing what one would have 
willfully done without external barrier 
(be it natural or artificial), external 
normative restrictions on an agent‟s 
freedom are those prohibitions of a legal 
or moral character which are instituted 
in the social order or orders to which the 
agent belongs. Fayemi (2010) states that 
“The impressive evidence of 
dictatorship (secular and ecclesiastical 
tyrannies), crass for power and clinging 
on to it at all cost, extradition, wars 
between peoples, persecutions and 
imperialism are all sorts of un-freedom 
and infact, factors responsible for the 
destruction of freedom” (p. 14). The 
problem of power mongering in the 
African continent amongst African 
political leaders is a good case in hand. 
From Zimbabwe to Kenya to Ivory 
Coast the story is the same. This 
problem of clinging to power at all cost 
has wasted and continues to waste 
properties and lives. Even those who 
managed to be alive have their freedom 
seriously eroded and curtailed. Besides 
these, human freedom may be seriously 
hampered by physical and psychological 
defects and weaknesses, which hinder 
the full expression and realization of 
man‟s full potentialities and personality. 
 
Apart from the external constraints, 
there is need to also consider the 
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problem of determinism vis-à-vis human 
freedom. Determinism is a philosophical 
doctrine which holds that man‟s actions 
are not borne out of freedom but rather 
are predetermined by external factors or 
by factors within himself or by his own 
being. On the other hand, indeterminism 
holds that the naïve consciousness of 
freedom is not an illusion and points out 
that all our concepts of merits, guilt, 
responsibility, praise and punishment 
presuppose it, and without a basis in 
freedom lose all meaning. Be that as it 
may, the question of human freedom is a 
topical one and also very much relevant 
in any discourse on human 
development. Hence it demands a 
serious and philosophical approach. 
 
Meaning and Nature of Human 
Rights 
Certainly two terms are related together 
in the concept “human rights”. We 
therefore consider it essential to give a 
brief characterization of the term “right” 
before relating it to human. In ordinary 
language right can be construed to mean 
„claim‟. Thus, when a Nigerian citizen 
says that he has a right to vote or be 
voted for, he is in way saying that he has 
a justifiable claim to take part in the 
electioneering process of choosing 
representatives to fill certain public 
offices; this claim is made possible 
because the citizen is aware that he 
satisfies the requirements either to vote 
or be voted for as stipulated in the 
constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, and that he is equally 
convinced that he has the abilities and 
the capabilities to take part in such a 
process. This citizen is therefore in a 
way calling the attention of the 
enforcers of the provisions of the 
constitution to respect his right and be 
just to him in this regard. This, no doubt 
is the sense in which Davitt (1959) 
understands right when he says, “A right 
is a claim for the enforcement, redress, 
or protection of which the jurisdiction of 
a court may be properly invoked” (p. 
33). This understanding of right gives it 
a legal status, that is, as something to be 
recognized and protected by a legal 
system. Paton (1957) captures the 
legality of right when he defines right as 
the “will power of man applied to a 
utility or interest recognized and 
protected by a legal system” (p.223). 
The three elements involved in the 
definition (which are will, power, 
interest, recognition and protection) 
qualify right as a legal one. McCloskey 
(1976) also argued that a right must or 
ought to be recognized in law. However, 
we are aware that right other than being 
legally conceived can equally be 
normatively construed. When right is 
seen as a normative claim, it need not 
necessarily be backed up or be protected 
by the authoritative pronouncement of a 
court, for instance, the right to 
conscience which is prior to legal rights 
(McCloskey, 1976.) 
 
So said, Human rights therefore may be 
defined as those rights which all men 
enjoy simply by virtue of their 
humanity, the deprivation of which 
would constitute a grave affront to 
man‟s natural sense of justice. Human 
rights are rights inherent to all human 
beings, whatever our nationality, place 
of residence, sex, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, language, or any 
other status. Thus we are all equally 
entitled to our human rights without 
discrimination. Like rights, human 
rights can equally be seen in two senses: 
legal rights and moral rights. Rights in 
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the legal sense denotes a benefit validly 
conferred by law, while moral rights 
designate rights as assertions of notions 
of wrongness and rightness without any 
baking of the legal and judicial system. 
Talk about human rights presupposes 
human interaction otherwise the whole 
concept of human rights wallows in 
meaninglessness. Carl Friedrick (as 
cited in Fasaro, 1993) captures the inter-
subjectivity basis for human rights when 
he, for instance, argues that, to have a 
right is to have a warrant, provided by 
socially establishing rules that hold 
against some at least loosely specified 
range of objections and that authorizes 
A, usually on his decision, to engage in 
a type of action that A judges to be 
advantageous to himself and that is 
often judged or can be expected often to 
be judged, disadvantageous to some B 
or Bs. It is observable from the above 
extract that rights are seen as social 
phenomena between or among humans 
in a social context – A‟s rights, the 
practice of which is often to be judged, 
disadvantageous to some B or Bs. This 
definition of rights is itself an agreement 
with H.L.A. Hart‟s view of anyone 
having right. According to Hart (1955), 
to have a right entails having moral 
justification for limiting the freedom of 
another person and for determining how 
he should act. Thus the concept of rights 
is rooted in human interaction whereby 
X‟s freedom in some sense restricts P‟s. 
No rights exist or can exist where there 
are no individual, identifiable people 
exercising or practicing those rights and 
justifying them. For instance A‟s rights 
to free movement may restrict B‟s 
because both of them are operating 
within the same social environment. If 
A were to be existing alone in such an 
environment, then it will be meaningless 
for A to assert that it has a right to free 
movement first for the fact that no one 
restricts its movement in the first place 
and second for the fact that A in that 
context will be talking to no one in 
particular, hence its assertion or claim 
makes no sense. 
 
Basic Tenets and Components of 
Human Rights 
There are some tenets and concepts that 
are basic to the idea of human rights. 
For instance, human rights are universal 
and inalienable. The principle of 
universalism speaks of universal rights 
that apply to all humans equally, 
whatever geographical location, state, 
race, or culture they belong to. In fact, 
all international human rights 
instruments adhere to the principle that 
human rights are universally applicable. 
The 2005 World Summit on Human 
Rights reaffirmed this principle when it 
argues that, the universal nature of 
human rights is the cornerstone of 
international human rights law. This 
principles as first emphasized in the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(UDHR) in 1948, has been reiterated in 
numerous international human rights 
conventions, declarations and 
resolutions. The 1993 Vienna World 
Conference on Human Rights noted that 
it is the duty of states to promote and 
protect all human rights and 
fundamental freedom, regardless of their 
political, economic and cultural systems. 
To this end therefore, regional human 
rights instruments based on cultural 
relativism should conduce or be made to 
conduce itself to the principle of 
universality of human rights. In fact, 
they should see the universal declaration 
of human rights as the benchmark for all 
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regional human rights. Human rights are 
also inalienable. The term inalienable 
rights (or unalienable rights) refer to a 
set of human rights that are 
fundamental, are not awarded by human 
power, and cannot be surrendered. The 
inalienability of human rights suggests 
that they should not be taken away 
except in specific situations and 
according to due process. For example, 
the right to liberty may be restricted if a 
person is found guilty of a crime by a 
court of law. 
 
Another basic tenet of human rights is 
that of equality and non-discrimination. 
The principle of non-discrimination 
applies to everyone in relation to all 
human rights and freedoms and 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of a 
list of non-exhaustive categories such as 
sex, race, colour etc. Non-discrimination 
is a cross-cutting principle in 
international human rights law. It is 
present in all the major human rights 
treaties and provides the central theme 
of some of international human rights 
conventions such as the international 
convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination and all 
forms of discrimination against women. 
The principle of non-discrimination is 
complemented by the principles of 
equality as stated in Article 1 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
“All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights”. 
 
Moreso, human rights are 
interdependent and indivisible whether 
they are civil and political rights such as 
the right to life, equality before the law 
and freedom of expression, economic, 
social and cultural rights, such as the 
rights to work, social security and 
education or collective rights such as the 
rights to development and self-
determination. These rights are 
indivisible, interrelated and 
interdependent such that the 
improvement of one facilitates the 
advancement of others; and the 
deprivation of one adversely affects 
others. The indivisibility and 
interdependence of all human rights is 
confirmed by the 1993 Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action 
(as cited in Fasaro, 1994) which says: 
 
“All human rights are universal, 
indivisible and interdependent 
and related. The international 
community must treat human rights  
globally in a fair and equal manner 
on the same footing, and with  
the same emphasis” (p. 88). 
 
What this passage is saying is that equal 
weight should be given to all rights be it 
civil and political rights or economic 
and social rights. 
 
However, opponents of the indivisibility 
of human rights argue that economic, 
social and cultural rights are 
fundamentally different from civil and 
political rights and require completely 
different approaches. According to this 
categorization, economic, social and 
cultural rights are said to be: positive 
(meaning that they require active 
provision of entitlements by the state as 
opposed to the state being required only 
to prevent the breach of rights), 
resource- intensive (meaning that they 
are expensive and difficult to provide) 
progressive (meaning that they will take 
significant time to implement) and that 
they are aspirations or goals as opposed 
to legal rights. On the other hand civil 
and political rights are categorized as 
negative (meaning the state can protect 
them simply by taking no action), cost-
  66 
 
Precious Uwaezurike Obioha                                                                                                           CUJPIA  (2017)  5(1) 60-73 
            
 
                       
 
 
free, immediate (meaning they can be 
immediately provided if the state 
decided to) and that they are real legal 
rights (Freeman, 2002). 
 
Human rights have been categorized 
under three generations -first 
generations, second generation and third 
generation of rights. However, this 
categorization is not rigid for the rights 
are closely related. 
 
The first generation human rights deal 
essentially with liberty and participation 
in political life. They are fundamentally 
civil and political in nature and serve to 
protect the individual from the excesses 
of the state. First generation rights 
include among others freedom of 
speech, the right to fair trial, freedom of 
religion and voting rights. It was 
pioneered by the United States Bills of 
Rights and in France by the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 
in the 18
th
 century. At the global level 
they were first enshrined by the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and given status in international law in 
Article 3 – 21 of the Universal 
Declaration and the International 
Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights. 
 
The second generation of rights is 
related to equality and was first 
recognized by governments after World 
War I. These rights are fundamentally 
social, economic and cultural in nature. 
They ensure different members of the 
citizenry equal condition and treatment. 
These rights include the right to work, 
the right to just condition of work, the 
right to fair remuneration, the right to an 
adequate standard of living, the right to 
organize, form and join trade union. The 
right to collective bargaining, the right 
to equal pay for equal work, the right to 
housing and health care, the right to 
social security, the right to education, 
the right to property and the right to 
enjoy the benefits of one‟s own creative 
activity. These rights are covered by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and are also embodied in Articles 22 to 
27 of the Universal Declaration and the 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. 
 
Third generation of human rights are 
those rights that go beyond the mere 
civil and social as expressed in many 
progressive documents of international 
law, including the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration of the United Nation 
Conference on the Human Environment 
and Development, and other pieces of 
generally inspirational “Soft law”. The 
third generation rights are largely 
unofficial and include such rights as: 
group and collective rights, right to 
economic and social development, right 
to a healthy environment, right to 
natural resources, right to participation 
in cultural heritage, rights to 
intergenerational equity and 
sustainability and the right to 
commutate and communication rights.  
 
Be that as it may, a number of criticisms 
have been leveled against the concept of 
human rights. Charles Blatterg in his 
essay, “The Ironic Tragedy of Human 
Rights”, has argued that rights talk, 
being abstract, demotivates people from 
upholding the values that rights are 
meant to assert. Alasdair Macintyre 
(1981) in his book, “After Virtue” 
claims that the concept that all human 
beings have certain rights simply by 
virtue of being human is illogical. He 
says the best reason for asserting so 
bluntly that there are no such rights is 
indeed of precisely the same type as the 
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best reason which we possess for 
asserting that there are no witches and 
the best reason which we possess for 
asserting that there are no unicorns: 
every attempt to give good reasons for 
believing there are such rights has 
failed. 
 
Karl Marx (cited in Fagan Andrew, 
2006) has equally criticized the 
declaration of the rights of man and of 
the citizen as bourgeois ideology. He 
writes: 
 
Above all, we note the fact that 
the so-called rights of man, the 
droits de l’homme as distinct from 
the droits du citoyen, are nothing 
but the rights of a member of civil 
society – i.e. the rights of egoistic 
man, of man separated from other 
men and from the 
community…according to the 
Declaration of the Rights of man 
of 1791: “Liberty, consists in 
being able to do everything which 
does not harm others” liberty, 
therefore, is the right to do 
everything that harms no one else. 
The limits within which anyone 
can act without harming someone 
else are defined by law, just as the 
boundary between two fields is 
determined by a boundary post 
(Andrew, 2006:p.154). 
What the above passage shows is that 
for Marx, liberal rights and ideals of 
justice are premised on the idea that 
each of us needs protection from other 
human beings. Therefore, liberal rights 
are rights of separation, designed to 
protect us from such perceived threats. 
Freedom on such a view is freedom 
from interference. What this view denies 
according to Marx is the possibility, the 
fact that real freedom is to be found 
positively in our relations with other 
people. It is to be found in human 
community, not in isolation. So insisting 
on a regime of rights encourages us to 
view each other in ways which 
undermine the possibility of the real 
freedom we may find in human 
emancipation. 
 
However, contrary to Karl Marx‟s 
argument that human rights create 
isolation and separation among human 
beings, the beauty of human rights is 
that it creates the needed atmosphere for 
peaceful human interaction without 
making wolves out of men. Without 
human rights, the concepts of duty and 
obligation will be meaningless. Real 
freedom lies in the ability to respect 
other people‟s rights in the course of the 
exercise of your freedom. John Finnis 
and Fagan Andrew (2006) argue that 
human rights are justifiable on the 
grounds of their instrumental value in 
creating the necessary condition for 
human well-being. Niraj Nathwani 
(2002, p.16) corroborates this when he 
argues that “human rights law, applied 
to a state‟s own citizen serves the 
interest of states, by, for example 
minimizing the risk of violent resistance 
and protest and by keeping the level of 
dissatisfaction with the government 
manageable”. 
 
Whatever the arguments of the critics of 
human rights may be, human rights are 
ordained “to protect ordinary people, 
minorities, groups and races, from 
oppressive rulers and governments” 
(Humana, 1983 p.10). The protection 
that human rights afford protects an 
individual against his fellow individual 
or human collectivities, organizations 
and institutions. The recognition and the 
promotion of equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human 
family is an imperative for freedom, 
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justice and peace in the world. President 
Reagan corroborates this view when he 
asserts that “world peace is attainable 
only if governments observe and 
guarantee human rights of their citizen 
(Reagan, 1987 p. 223). From a positive 
communitarian angle, human rights, 
other than preventing the State from 
interfering in the lives of citizens also 
obliges the State and other social beings 
within the social system to intervene in 
the lives of the people in other to create 
opportunities that will enable them lead 
a minimally happy life. Therefore 
contrary to the critics of human rights, 
human rights are categorical imperatives 
for not only ensuring the dignity and 
equality of man, but also world peace. 
 
Obstacles to the Realization of 
Human Rights 
The gross violation of human rights 
across the world shows that the issue of 
human rights is yet to be accorded the 
recognition and respect it demands 
across nations and across peoples. Gross 
violations of human rights abound in 
Africa. Amaku Ejiogu (2003) opines 
that majority of Africans are illiterates, 
homeless, jobless and refugees in 
foreign grounds. Denial of salaries, 
arbitrary beheading of human beings for 
unjust reasons, forced marriages and 
rapes, unjust victimization of the weak 
by superior powers, damage of social 
amenities, the irremediable issues of 
ethnic marginalization, the swindling of 
justice to the richer etc are cases of 
human rights abuses on the black 
continent. Many are the obstacles and 
circumstances that make the realization, 
protection and enforcement of 
fundamental human rights impossible. 
Obafemi Awolowo (cited in Shivji, 
1989) lists such obstacles as: epidemic, 
war, relationship, taking of other 
people‟s life unjustifiably, improper 
acquisition of wealth and property etc. 
Awolowo suggests that anybody who 
takes another person‟s life unjustifiably 
or acquire wealth/property through an 
improper means can have his/her human 
rights like right to life or right to 
property eroded away. But taking 
somebody‟s life under any circumstance 
even as a punitive measure is itself de-
humanizing and therefore unacceptable; 
thus Awolowo errs here. Instead, the 
person‟s other rights say his/her rights to 
and freedom of movement, association 
can be curtailed and not his/her right to 
life for right to life is inalienable and 
absolute, it is innate and natural dignity 
of man and therefore should not be 
taken under any guise. 
 
Moreso, we identify the problem of 
leadership or government itself and the 
overwhelming contradictions plaguing 
the constitution of many states as 
obstacles to the realization of human 
rights in addition to the ones listed by 
Awolowo. Through corruption and bad 
leadership, governments most times 
trample on people‟s human rights in 
order to satisfy and further their egoistic 
tendencies. The issue of abuse of human 
rights by governments is more 
pronounced under military and 
autocratic/authoritarian regimes. 
Military regimes are known for ruling 
by decree. There is no respect to the rule 
of law among the military juntas. In 
such regimes human rights are not easily 
recognized and protected. Examples of 
this abound during the military regimes 
of General Ibrahim Babangida and the 
late despot General Sani Abacha in 
Nigeria. Surprisingly, even in 
democratic regimes, especially in 
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Africa, human rights have not fared 
well. There were cases of human rights 
abuses and non-respect to the rule of 
law during the nine years of former 
President Obasanjo‟s administration and 
the present administration of 
Muhammed Buhari where there are 
many cases of where courts of 
competent jurisdiction have positively 
ruled on the bail applications of certain 
accused persons, yet the federal 
government refused to grant them bail 
or where the federal government have 
used the apparatus of DSS to harass 
certain persons without due process. 
 
In addition, the justice system that 
operates in a given state can hinder the 
flowering of human rights. If the justice 
system is punitive then gross violations 
of people‟s rights and freedom will be 
inevitable. Moreso, the influence of 
nature and nurture as limiting factors to 
the realization of human rights ideals 
has been identified. By nature, some 
people are biologically servile and feel 
nothing wrong with being treated 
unequally. While at the level of nurture, 
education and society play major role. 
One‟s level of education can determine 
one‟s attitudes and approach to issues of 
human rights. Illiterates or the less 
educated often times are less concerned 
or totally ignorant of their rights. At the 
level of society, there are some 
conditions that affect one‟s level of 
freedom such as childhood experiences 
and the domineering posture of the 
society/community over the individual. 
For instance the African exaggerated 
ideas of society almost exclude entirely 
the philosophy of the individuality of 
the human person. The African 
individual is not known and interacted 
with as an irreplaceable, autonomous 
being, but only through his or her family 
or society backgrounds; the individual is 
forced as it were to hide under the cloak 
of society. The individual has almost no 
person and can hardly exercise personal 
voluntareity outside his or her social 
community pretentions. Acting outside 
the interests of his community would 
automatically attract ostracism and 
marginalization, as he or she would be 
judged a social deviant. It is upon this 
depersonalization and dehumanization 
of the individual that human rights are 
crassly violated in Africa: politically, 
religiously and culturally. 
 
Relationship between Freedom and 
Human Rights 
Our analysis of the concepts of human 
freedom and human rights shows a 
strong link between the two concepts. In 
fact to talk of one is to talk of the other, 
for none of the concepts can be 
successfully discussed without including 
the other. Therefore both concepts are 
interrelated ideals that humans aspire to 
attain. Human rights and human 
freedom are mutually reciprocal and 
reinforcing and should be treated as 
such. For instance in the exercise of 
every “right to”, there is or ought to be 
“freedom to”. The recognition and the 
accordance of “right to” association; 
religion etc. should invariably be 
recognition and the promotion of 
“freedom to” association, and religion 
etc. Having a “right to” should be 
corresponded with having a “freedom 
to” in the context of availability of the 
enabling condition for the exercise of 
the “right to”. What is a “right to” if 
there is no corresponding “freedom to” 
exercise such right? Therefore in 
matters of voting for instance, which is a 
right to all qualified citizens guaranteed 
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by the constitution, a candidate succeeds 
in exercising a “freedom to” within the 
context of a “right to” if he or she 
succeeds in voting for a candidate of his 
or her choice without arbitrariness, 
constraint and undue interference with 
his/her choice. The provision of a “right 
to” should be backed up with the 
creation of the atmosphere for the 
preservation and expression of “freedom 
to” exercise such a “right to”. A right to 
vote (choose one‟s representative) or be 
voted for is empty and useless if there is 
no provision of maximum security for 
the lives of voters given the incessant 
cases of election brutalities and violence 
that characterize elections in Nigeria. 
Due to insecurity of lives and properties 
many would not be able to exercise that 
right. A right to choose one‟s 
representatives is made useless if one‟s 
votes do not count at the end of the day 
because of rigging and other electoral 
malpractices. Most people in Nigeria 
today, have developed apathy towards 
election because what actually takes 
place is selection and not election. The 
much talked about right to be voted for 
today lacks the „freedom to‟ because of 
the expensive nature of electioneering 
process. Election in Nigeria today is 
meant for the „money bags‟ not for the 
low or middle class but visionary 
citizens. 
 
In the same vein, every “freedom from” 
on the part of the citizen is an 
entitlement or a right demandable by 
them, while every “right to be free 
from” constitutes an obligation on the 
part of state denoting actions that a 
government should not take. For 
instance, where the citizens have the 
freedom of assembly which is a “right 
to” on their part, the state has the duty of 
not restraining the rights to be free from 
assembly. Therefore every “freedom 
from” manifests itself through a right 
to”. Since every “freedom from” 
discrimination is a fundamental element 
of human rights that promotes human 
dignity, the corresponding right to it is 
the “right to equality”. The universalism 
of life claims demands that all people 
treat all others equally without 
discrimination. This freedom from 
discrimination gives birth to the right to 
equality which has been the driving 
force for human development and 
equality before the law. The above 
instances show the intricate relationship 
between freedom and right. Ant it must 
be noted that when these freedoms and 
rights are recognized, respected and 
promoted, they enable man to fully 
develop and use all human qualities 
such as intelligence, talents and 
conscience to satisfy both spiritual and 
mundane needs. Human freedoms and 
rights promote and protect the dignity of 
the human person. Therefore every 
constraints and impediments to the 
flowering of human freedom and rights 




Human freedom and human rights are 
considered great beacons and 
springboard for human flourishing, thus 
it is understandable why the two 
concepts have become topical in 
contemporary discourse and the quest 
for it has continued despite mounting 
obstacles to its realization. The general 
well-being of man and world peace has 
been seen to largely depend on the 
promotion of human freedom and 
human rights. 
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Therefore, no matter what the arguments 
of the critics of human rights and human 
freedom are, they have not succeeded 
and perhaps will never succeed in 
vitiating the relevance of philosophical 
discourse on how better to achieve and 
promote human freedom and human 
rights nor will it even vitiate the quest 
for human rights and freedom in the first 
place. 
 
The ideals of human rights and human 
freedom should be the concern of all 
and sundry cultural particularities and 
ideological differences notwithstanding. 
They should not be seen to be the 
prerogative of the West neither should 
other nations shy away from its 
recognition and promotion as a 
universal ideal. To this end therefore, 
the former prime ministers of Singapore, 
Lee Kuan Yew and of Malaysia 
Mahathir bin Mohammad were both 
wrong when they claimed in the 1990s 
that “Asian values were significantly 
different from Western values and 
included a sense of loyalty and 
foregoing personal freedom for the sake 
of social stability and prosperity and 
therefore authoritarian government is 
more appropriate in Asia than 
democracy”. Authoritarianism is not 
appropriate anywhere since it stifles the 
flourishing of human freedom and 
rights. Infact, Mahathir‟s former deputy, 
A. Ibrahim in reaction said, “To say that 
freedom is Western or Un- Asian is to 
offend our tradition as well as our 
forefathers who gave their lives in the 
struggle against tyranny and injustices”. 
 
However, granted the fact that there 
may be, for matters of convenience and 
uniqueness of interests, differences in 
the regional instruments of human 
rights, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights should provide the bench 
mark for all regional declaration of 
human rights. Moreso, there should be 
serious commitment to the recognition 
and promotion of human rights and 
human freedom by government, states 
and peoples the world over. 
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